Randall L. Calvert’s “Leadership and Its Basis of Social Coordination”.

Calvert (1992) defines leadership in terms of the functions it performs for social groups: it is a “means by which social groups attempt to realize gains from cooperation, coordination, and efficient allocation.” There are a couple of implications of this conceptualization that seem problematic. First, Calvert’s understanding of leadership suggests that fully formed groups recognize the need for decisive arbitrary action at certain key junctures, at which point they select someone whose authority “group members come to recognize” over time (p. 15). This view seems to take the existence of undifferentiated social groups for granted, not considering the role of leaders in mobilizing groups in the first place. Instead of acknowledging leadership only in the face of specific social dilemmas, it seems more reasonable to treat leadership as a constant feature of organized groups, albeit one that changes over time and across circumstances. Second, Calvert’s focus on the ability of leadership to solve coordination problems seems to be biased in favor of successful leadership. He bestows leaders with great ability to isolate equilibrium solutions, underemphasizing the extent to which leaders, facing uncertain circumstances, might make decisions that are harmful to the group’s long-term interests. A leader’s decisions seem to have instantaneous feedback; as long as he or she picks equilibrium solutions (p. 16), then he or she will retain the group’s support. But in reality, it seems that the impact of a leader’s decisions is often not immediately felt.

(1) When the author talks about solutions to ‘Primary Problems’, specifically application of selected incentives as one of the possible leadership strategies for inducing cooperation, he identifies two possible types of leaders – (a) political entrepreneurs who “has built-in incentives to act as a leader in creating conditions, in which cooperation can occur”, and (b) a leader ‘created’ by the group itself as a provider of specific incentives. Can these two ideal types be applied to Michel’s analysis of a metamorphosis that occurs to a political leader? In other words, does the type (b) correspond to Michel’s politician before the change and type (a) - to this politician after he has been in a position of authority for some time?
(2) Calvert claims the applicability of his model to the analysis of contemporary Western-style political figures. How does one reconcile Calvert’s analytical framework with the fact that in contemporary Western societies much of the coordination and allocation problems are resolved by administrative and legal enforcement apparatus, as well as various norm-producing institutions? Does Calvert overestimate the role of leadership at the expense of existing institutions?