In Riker’s The Art of Political Manipulation, “heresthetic” refers to “a political strategy…”, which involves “structuring the world so you can win” (ix).” In this memo I ask, and attempt to answer, several questions. How does heresthetic relate to leadership? More specifically, what view of leadership does the concept imply? How does heresthetic relate to other, more common sociological concepts, such as framing, power, and identity? Finally, what can social choice theory offer to studies of leadership?
Heresthetic and Leadership
Although Riker’s examples of heresthetics are clearly meant to demonstrate some sort of leadership, Riker rarely discusses leadership in any explicit way. If the book is read through the lens of leadership, though, it becomes fairly clear that Riker equivocates between viewing leadership (or at least heresthetical leadership) as a) a capacity held and used by individuals, and b) a structural condition which allows certain persons to exploit their position. The Democratic city manager of chapter 6 is illustrative of this. She wanted to gerrymander district lines to ensure Democratic control of city council, but needed to avoid the appearance of political opportunism. Her heresthetical maneuver involved a plan—eventually successful—to sue the city in Federal court for violating civil rights. Granted, the maneuver was well planned and executed by the city manager. Yet it was only possible given certain structural pre-conditions: judicial precedents requiring equalized voting districts; Republican control of county courts and Democratic control of Federal courts; popular support for equal rights; and the city manager’s professional position as a powerful, well-connected politician. Yet Riker would probably maintain that there is an agentic element of personal capacity that is fundamental to heresthetical leadership. Which is more important for heresthetical leadership—capacity or structure—remains elusive.
A second question asks about the role of heresthetics in leadership, broadly conceived. Heresthetical skill seemingly helps in leadership. But is heresthetical skill necessary for leadership? Can poor herestheticians be successful leaders? I am not sure what Riker would say to this. My only guess is that he might acknowledge that leaders are able to compensate for poor heresthetical skills with other heightened abilities in, for example, rhetoric. Personally, however, I would say that heresthetical skill is not necessary for leadership. The reasons for this will be addressed in the discussion of power and identity below.
Heresthetics, Framing, Power, and Identity
One type of heresthetical maneuver discussed by Riker is manipulation of dimensions, which has a close sociological analogue in framing (or, perhaps more specifically, frame extension). Snow et al. (1986) describe frame extension as attempts by a group to “enlarge its adherent pool by portraying its objectives or activities as attending to or being congruent with the values or interests of potential adherents (472).” We see exactly this happening in Riker’s examples of multiplying dimensions. Take the story of Warren Magnuson and the nerve gas (Chapter 10). “When the issue was framed in one dimension, approval or disapproval of Operation Red Hat,” Magnuson and supporters could not win the vote. “But when the dimension of senatorial consent was added, ten marginal votes were won,” which led to a victory for Magnuson (Riker 1986, 112 italics added). Snow et al. regard frames in the broad context of social movements, while Riker seems interested in structured, formal political scenarios. In this sense, frames may be applied more broadly than Riker’s dimensions. However, there is clearly an affinity between the concepts.
While there is a close analogy between dimensions and frames, Riker’s implicit view of power may be somewhat shortsighted, sociologically speaking. Riker is clear that herestheticians are largely constrained by existing conditions. Importantly, they “can neither create preferences nor hypnotize” (64). This point, along with Riker’s discussion of agenda control, begs for a comparison to social scientific writings on various “faces” of power (Lukes 1974). The first face of power refers to A’s ability to make B act in a way contrary to B’s wishes. The second face of power refers to A’s ability to enact his or her will, contrary to B’s wishes, through control of an agenda and the utilization of “non-decisions”. The third face of power refers to A’s ability to influence what B understands to be his or her interests. Riker says little about the first face of power. But his discussion of agenda control bears much similarity to the second face of power. Yet from the quotation above, we see that there is no space in Riker’s account of heresthetics for the third face of power; herestheticians work with extant preferences and interests, but they do not create or change them. In this sense, heresthetics is a somewhat impotent means of leadership, as it is resigned to existing preference structures. It follows, then, that leaders, if they are successful in exploiting this third face of power, may be quite powerful even if they are mediocre herestheticians.
One way in which Riker’s framework is strikingly at odds with mainstream sociology is in his view of political groups. “We interpret majorities as no more than artifacts of the head count, and we specifically deny that they make sense independently of the arithmetic (87).” For Riker, it is a “fundamental error…[to believe] that everyone on the same side has (or ought to have) the same opinions (86).” It is of course obvious that some political alliances are built on compromises, and that such compromises happen in spite of otherwise conflicting interests of the compromisers. But is this always the case, as Riker suggests? Is there nothing that can hold a group together other than (a possibly ephemeral) alignment of individual interests?
I think most sociologists would say no. Research on collective identities (Melucci 1989), whatever its conceptual or methodological flaws (see Polletta and Jasper 2001), illustrates the potential importance of personal identification with a larger group. Citizens, and probably even political officials, are not as myopic as Riker asserts. Coalitions can be enlarged or strengthened through an enhanced sense of collective identity, and this need not be based entirely on the alignment of narrow self-interest. Riker ignores the fact that this sense of collective identity can be a strategic resource for leaders. For leaders lacking in heresthetical skills, the enhancement of collective identity may be an alternate means of achieving group success.
Social Choice Theory and Leadership
These latter two points—regarding the third face of power and collective identity—finally bring us to a consideration of social choice theory’s utility in analyzing leadership. Riker describes social choice theory as consisting of “descriptions and analyses of the way that the preferences of individual members of a group are amalgamated into a decision for the group as a whole (xi).” Because Riker himself does not elaborate the relationship between social choice theory and the analysis of leadership per se, I will simply suggest some cautionary reminders rather than offer critique.
As an analytical device, heresthetics arises from a social choice framework. Herestheticians manipulate and exploit the amalgamation process. As noted in an earlier section, this probably does constitute some form of leadership. But besides the amalgamation process, an equally important component of social choice theory seems to be the “preferences of individual members of a group (xi).” If The Art of Political Manipulation is illustrative of social choice theory, then I fear that social choice theorists leave the “preferences” component unproblematized. This comes out in two ways, both already mentioned. First, a theory of leadership that does not consider the third face of power (i.e. preference manipulation) is too narrow. Riker directly states that heresthetics is not about changing preferences. Yet Riker also does not claim that heresthetics wholly constitutes leadership. Thus, social choice theory may allow analytical space for leadership that can alter individuals’ preferences. I believe it should.
A second concern regarding social choice theory and leadership reiterates the relevance of identity. In Riker’s analysis, individuals may strategize against or cooperate with other individuals, but these actions are done solely on the basis of personal preference. There is no possibility in his account for collective identity. Although using the “people-oriented/task-oriented” (Aminzade, Goldstone, & Perry 2001) dichotomy as the basis for leadership research may be problematic, the concept of people-oriented leadership (or charismatic leadership, for that matter) should not be wholly jettisoned. The organization of people into a group(-for-itself) with some collective identity remains relevant to collective action and group coherence, however imperfect it may be.
Aminzade, Ron, Jack Goldstone, and Elizabeth Perry. 2001. “Leadership Dynamics and Dynamics of Contention.” In Aminzade, Goldstone, McAdam, Perry, Sewell, Jr., Tarrow, and Tilly (eds.). Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lukes, Stephen. 1974. Power: A Radical View.
Polletta, Francesca and James Jasper. 2001. “Collective Identity and Social Movements.” Annual Review of Sociology, 27: 283-305.
Melucci, Alberto. 1989. Nomads of the Present. Temple Press.
Snow, David, E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford. 1986. “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation.” American Sociological Review, 51 (4): 464-481.
