Kurzman, Charles. The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran.

Charles Kurzman proposes a novel way of defining how the revolution happened and he refers to it as an “anti-explanation”. Economic, political, cultural, organizational, and military explanations have been successful but were not inclusive (6). He does not fully approve their approach and believes their retroactive predictions flawed to some extent. The anti explanation foregrounds the confusion, instability, and unpredictability of revolutionary moments for participants. Although Kurzman analyses the level of instability and violence was less than many other countries which faced revolution, the following question remains. Could the lack of relative violence and confusion result in defining the revolution as unpredictable or because it did not follow the pattern of the classical social movements theory?
Bazargan a Free rider or Nationalist?
Many oppositionists, expecting a revolution followed Khomeini’s strategy in order to assure seats in his government. Mehdi Bazargan, a liberal oppositionist, realizing the weakness of his group’s ideology changed positions and gained a post in revolutionary government. Bazargan and Khomeini envisioned a clear and achievable revolution and they already had the step by step plan (3). Khomeini’s lack of political knowledge and administration was a big problem to Bazargan (3). However, Khomeini’s strategy of politicizing Islam seemed to be successful in achieving their goal and Bazargan trusted him.
Models and theories:
The author mentions that every country’s revolution is unique in its own way. Is it always necessary to draw a model or find an applicable model in order to categorize it? It is difficult to apply one revolutionary model drawn for a specific country to another. Could these models occasionally harm the glory of the revolution, reduce the level of understanding on how the revolution took place, and create an ambiguous puzzle?
When Iranians themselves are not fully sure about the formation of the revolution, Kurzman drew a conclusion with data and statistics that lacked credibility. Kurzman agrees that the sources and statistics were not fully reliable but his thoughts, evidences, and perceptions helped him draw the conclusion. Did he listen to those “thousand stories and explanations that each were correct in their own way” to draw his conclusion? (84) Kurzman needed to integrate more anecdotes, diversify his interviews and integrate different socioeconomic backgrounds in his book. That would help him reduce the confusion of how the society mobilized and integrated.
Military and lack of reinforcement:
Why didn’t The Shah fully use the military power in order to crack down definitively? He had one of the strongest armies in the region. Was his sickness an issue? Did he really care about the people that he did not want to harm them or torture them? In the beginning of the movement he could have specifically taken control of the situation. Did he underestimate the power of the masses and specifically the Islamic oppositionists?
Who did The Shah really fear?
The Shah thought that the writers, lawyers, and liberal oppositionists were capable of changing the regime and was willing to negotiate with them. Kurzman states that the Shah (section Shii Appeals, A Viable Movement) does not take Khomeini’s movement seriously until the number of demonstrators and strikes increased dramatically and their ideology of the state had totally changed. The Shah was busy with the economic reform and involved in many foreign meetings and he could not redirect his focus on these issues to suppress the movement? Why didn’t America, Iran’s strongest ally, take action or waken up Iran’s government? Did they have to wait until the last days to come illegally into Iran in order to give military bases instructions?
Exploring the Persian Culture:
Kurzman does not explore the Iranian culture in depth. The motives for joining in the strikes and movements could have been richly explained from cultural context. He mentions that solidarity exists within the home but not outside and the movement helped unite the inner and outer sphere of the society (139). Lack of solidarity exists until this day and they still do not trust each other. Trust formation during the revolution was the product of a planned behavior. Islamist oppositionist had the intention to unify Iranians for their own solidarity and they achieved their goal.
Joining the protests:
Many people knew that they needed to get involved in order to save face in front of the rest of the society. Many knew that they would not get new positions or save their job if they were known as resisters. Additionally the book confirms that people could get killed and their assets would be demolished if they would not cooperate. They did not want their reputation and life ruined.
Change of Character:
As the rhythm of the strike movements changed and intensified the characters also changed. Many people from the public sector were present but the movement was dominated by the bazaaris and the urban poor. Kurzman does not emphasis why these groups which have recently migrated to the city became easily influenced by the Mullahs and Khomeini. Could it be because they lacked class consciousness in a very class conscious society and they were hoping to create a new identity for themselves?
Various Oppositionist Groups:
According to Kurzman, the aspirations of the revolution based on the most popular slogan were "Independence, Freedom and Islamic Republic." This slogan shaped and framed the mentality of Iranians and it was enough to mobilize them. Having the charismatic Khomeini as the spiritual leader helped stop them from questioning the degree of change and what kind of freedom they will get. Iranians got an Islamic Republic without having particularly any idea of what they were getting into. Based on Iranians responses they all agreed to just not to have a monarchy.
Other groups had an important impact in shaping the revolution but Kurzman underreports them. This results in confusion. Other groups such as the Marxist group, Liberal Oppositionist, Communist, and the Mujahedin group (which the author discusses them briefly although they played a major role in the viability of the revolution) had different interpretation of the central themes. These modernized groups came together because of Khomeini’s charismatic character. Were there any other options to create a more homogenous group of social actors for the revolution that was more democratic minded?
Media and Framing:
Media and effective communication had a major role in framing audiences and followers. Media helped speed up formation of unity and solidarity movements (p164). Khomeini used Islamic symbols and politicized them. He associated Iranians with Islamic themes in order to awaken the inner Muslim character within every individual. Khomeini reinforced his messages repeatedly and created a new model of social norms. Khomeini used his charisma and religious hierarchy to implement his strategy. Individual’s interpreted him as a holly Imam. Khomeini shaped the public opinion. He defined how a good Muslim should live, behave, and act as a revolutionary.
Various oppositionists groups thought they will have a say in what would happen after the revolution occurs and they will be able to shape and implement the policies within the Islamic state. This resulted in unifying the rest of the oppositionist groups and giving them, a sense of solidarity. The mass movements created solidarity. Iranians were in a state of false consciousness. They were informed enough to follow the rules. Khomeini’s religious authority did not allow anyone to question his ideology or his plans. Islamists strategically focused on priming and framing. The society had to achieve an Islamic state, or what Khomeini claimed to be what god wanted. No questions asked!
Iranians are like sheep (129):
Is it possible that Iranians were waiting for some movement driving by a strong leading figure for them to follow like sheep! And just to overthrow the Shah’s monarchy? Did it matter what happens next? Was it something to keep them busy with all the free time they got since their jobs never required more than 70 minutes of real work? Were they over satisfied with what they had and just needed a change?
The Shah and his Promises:
Was there a chance that the Shah really wanted to make reforms, offer more freedom, (58) or he was truly converting after 37 years? Why did Khomeini keep referring to the Shah’s announcements as tricks (58)? Khomeini did not allow individuals to decode or mentally process the Shah’s announcements. Why didn’t they believe the Shah and give him a second chance? He often delivered what people needed (White revolution). The Shah was not clear what he wanted to do, why didn’t Khomeini clarify what would be realized as far as aspirations for independence or what would be an independent economy.
Thinkable:
Just because the movement did not engage by using machine guns does that follow that protestors understood clearly that the movement could succeed without violence (157)? Does this mean that they were aware of the revolutions viability?
Why did Khomeini often respond to protestors “that it is our duty to struggle in this fashion and the result is with Allah” (157). Was he disclaiming responsibility for unthinkable and unplanned incidents with politicized religious statements?
Consciousness:
Did Iranians truly want to use Shiism as a cultural reservoir or a tool kit for a movement construction (56)? Only 10% of the society was active in the movement and formation of the revolution; where was the rest? And why didn’t they engage in the demonstrations? Could it be that they were neither political nor religious; or is it that they were content with their lives? Or could they be showing their objection using the exit strategy by not engaging in any demonstrations? In interviews some intellectuals did not support Khomeini (142); however, for the time being they were supporting him to change the regime. Were they concerned about the aftermath or just over romanticizing about a glorious democratic future? Did Iranians know they would create the most democratic dictatorship and the most dictatorial democracy?
Revolution:
The oil embargo increased Iran’s oil revenue dramatically (86). This new wealth accelerated the Shah's timetable to make Iran catch up with the West. The Shah's determination to modernize Iran overnight and at any cost led to a cultural shock, alienation of the masses, inflation, corruption, economic blockage, massive urbanization, rising expectations and increasing authoritarianism in dealing with these social, economic and political problems (85). Was there truly a problem with absorptive capacity (87)? Why did he import truck drivers when people had nothing to do and were striking? Could the author be bias toward the formation of the revolution? He does not offer much information from the Shah’s side.
My thought on this book:
This book was very informative. However, I believe the author assumes prior knowledge on Iran and the revolution’s history. He needs to provide an effective chronology of the history for the reader. Additionally, he does not identify many of the key revolutionary groups and individuals; maybe he did not want to shift the focus of his argument. However, I believe his incomplete evidence reduces his credibility. His model did not show persuasively that all Iranians could see the revolution foreseeable. Although Kurzman is convinced that a lot of the past explanations do not fit well but perhaps he is better at critiquing than offering a new explanation. The fact that he believed the revolution was very unpredictable plus some of the elements were confusing and unstable does not mean the whole population including the protestors and revolutionaries felt the same way. The majority of Iranian protestors who were firm immediate followers knew that the revolution would take place. The author could have unfolded his theory better. More historical thoughts and information would have been helpful.