Goldernberg

I. State -- Society
In order to understand political outcomes such a dictatorship, democracy & development, state-society scholars contend that political, social and ideational life cannot be understood as purely reflecting economic phenomenon. (Kohli, 2002:86) Rather, state and society are both autonomous from one another but also “mutually constitutive”. (ibid, citing Bendix 1962:286-90) What does this mean for researchers?
First, most state-society scholars are committed to generalizable knowledge at the middle level of analysis, avoiding on the one hand grand structural claims, and at the other hand specific details of empirical situations as an end in itself. For example, Wiktorowicz studies the manipulation of Islamic symbols by the state in order to understand how the Jordanian regime regulates religion in order to manage collective action. (Wiktorowicz, 46) Generalizations from such case-studies do not necessarily apply to all regimes or even to the Jordanian regime in all periods. Rather, the generalizations from this case are used to incrementally refine middle-range contingent generalizations, which are then applied back to within case generalizations (the Jordanian regime at other times) and to other cases. (George & Bennett, 2005: 123-4)
Second, social reality is sui generis. (Kohli, 2002:89) Social formations must be studied in part independently from the individuals who created them. In other words, social and political reality must be studied as more than simply the aggregation of individual actions. The fluctuating bargain between al-Azhar and the Egyptian state is not merely a product of maneuvers by respective leaders. Rather, leaders emerge from and react to social forces. Third, political structures are influenced by social dynamics but are not simply determined by them. For example, political outcomes, such as al-Azhar policy in the mid-1990s, is influenced in part by social forces (Islamists) and in part by political factors (the state).
Fourth, interests are neither socially constructed, nor are they permanently fixed in stone. Ideas/institutions and economic interests mutually condition one another. Both must be taken into account for a full analysis of political outcomes. Wedeen fills a gap in this approach by exploring how we may measure ways that ideas condition political outcomes. Incorporating the causal influence of ideas into models of political outcomes is difficult since we cannot get into the heads of political actors. For example, we cannot test whether a given state action (such as coopting al-Azhar) leads to less legitimacy in the minds of its citizens.
Fifth, state-society scholars take history seriously. (Ibid, 90) Political outcomes are influenced by institutional decisions from an earlier era and must therefore be incorporated into any analysis. For example, Moustafa contends that the Mubarek regime learned a lesson from previous attempts to manipulate al-Azhar and this influenced their policy choices in the mid-1990s. Sixth and finally, state-society scholars generally focus on real-world puzzles that demand explanation. Theory is a means for analyzing empirical puzzles, while results contribute back to theory by confirming, challenging or modifying other research findings.
II. The State & Religious Institutions
Moustafa attempts to explain a puzzle: what explains al-Azhar’s open opposition to the Mubarak regime in the 1990s despite its being historically coopted by the state? He argues that the increase in Islamic violence gave al-Azhar leverage over the government. The government was forced to strike a bargain with al-Azhar since it depended on al-Azhar's support against Islamists. This bargain meant al-Azhar was able to push a gentle Islamic agenda in exchange for fatwas which sought to give cover to the state and delegitimize the Islamist claim to righteousness.
The most troubling aspect of this analysis is the vague role of legitimacy. What is legitimacy? How is it measured? Employed? How do we know when it is gained or lost? Moustafa attempts to ascertain the degree to which government manipulation affects the legitimacy of al-Azhar by noting, a) the purported grievances of Islamists, b) the documented reasons for the Muslims Brotherhoods assassination of Sadat in al-Faridah al-Gha’iba and, c) a single incident where the state relied on the moderate Brotherhood instead of al-Azhar. However this evidence shows only that Islamist groups believe al-Azhar is illegitimate, not Egyptian society writ large. As such, it is unclear that gentle cooption ultimately renders the regime more legitimate than does firm cooption.
Moustafa could avoid this problem by employing Wedeen’s approach. Wedeen conceptualizes culture as semiotic practices – the study of signs/symbols and their use or interpretation – in order to demonstrate how those symbols are deployed to promote a given outcome. Utilizing Wedeen brings us to a different conclusion than that reached by Moustafa. The regime alternately manipulates or gives free reign to al-Azhar in order to maximize its power vis-à-vis oppositional forces. Depending on the opposition group, they need to use certain symbols. For the “international community,” they employ elections, or allow protests in order undermine criticisms of the regime. In the face of Islamist opposition, they use al-Azhar to similarly undercut Islamist opposition. Analyzing symbols this way – as tools of symbolic power rather than tools of legitimacy - means that the outcome is not high or low levels of legitimacy, but rather the pursuit of high levels of state power. Mubarek’s actions make sense given the relevant threats to regime. Rather than being a tool of legitimacy, Islamic legal interpretation is a form of symbolic power.
Goldberg provides a third, slightly different perspective. He argues that a comparison of Sunni movements in Egypt and sixteenth-century Protestant reformers sheds light on the sources and meaning of fundamentalism. He argues that fundamentalism can be understood as a critique of arbitrary absolutist power during periods of state building. Both movements transferred religious authority away from absolutist power and toward voluntary, motivated believers. (3-4) Both may also serve as the basis for post absolutist authority since their argument is for public authority vested in the mass of believers. Thus both movements contain a seed of the anarchist principle that human society can be cohesive and productive without hierarchical authority. Goldberg reminds us that Islamist fundamentalism may not be a reaction against modernity or liberalism (although it may be) but rather a positive movement toward a more egalitarian distribution of power in the state. Mubarak seeks the imprimatur of al-Azhar because it permits a less egalitarian distribution of power and thus more social control.
I’ll close with a second reverent critique of Moustafa. His puzzle, why would an authoritarian regime permit open opposition?, is premised on a usefully one-dimensional notion of authoritarianism. First, assuming that the Egyptian regime always seeks to “regulate and coopt religious institutions to use them in the service of the state” allows him to show that coopting religious symbols may occur in different ways at different times. (9) Second, assuming that scholars of developing states believe, “a preponderance of state power over society will inevitably give it [the state] the ability to shape society as it wants” allows him to show that society does in fact influence the state. (18) Third, assuming initially that the government would consistently act the same toward al-Azhar allowed him to show that Mubarak did not act the same as Sadat or Nasser. His conclusion, that the schizophrenic shifts in policy result from the relationship between state power and social control, only solves a puzzle if one believes that policies would otherwise stay the same, or that all authoritarian regimes act the same. It would be useful if Moustafa identified the sources of support for the regime. Different kinds of authoritarianism – personalist dictators, military rulers, single party regimes - break down in different ways and may make policy in different ways as well. (Geddes 1999)